But in its previous breach notifications, the company had carefully spoken about customer data (which makes most of us think of information such as address, phone number, payment card details, and so on) and encrypted password vaults as two distinct categories.
The good news, LastPass continues to insist, is that the security of the backed-up passwords in your vault file should be no different from the security of any other cloud backup that you encrypted on your own computer before you uploaded it.
Vault Basic-2015-EN-64bit-with-Crack-X-Force
LastPass needs to disclose what fields are actually encrypted. Are the notes in the password vault encrypted? They only mention secure notes which live elsewhere. Also be aware that the bad actors have all the customer data you mention plus the URLs of every site in your password vault. Those are not encrypted. Nice helping hand the to credential stuffers!
Anyway, my inclination is like that of several previous commenters: I use a local password storage solution and backup my password vault as a genuinely fully-encrypted BLOB, as I would back up any encrypted data.
Someone like BitWarden has a lot more incentive to keep my password vault secure than these third party providers. Without that trust, they are worthless. However, Dropbox can get breached and survive because people use it for more than storing a password vault.
Presumably the key vaults are decrypted on LastPass servers prior to being rendered in the browser/relayed to the LastPass extension? In this case there would be at least two possible avenues a threat actor could theoretically utilise to obtain plaintext credentials:1) Access to the memory of the LastPass servers responsible for decrypting the vaults2) Intercepting requests sent from the decrypted vaults to the LastPass extension/browser page.
I will admit that my original assumption was that the entire vault was encrypted, so that the whole thing would be downloaded in order to be used. But it turns out that the website names in the vault are unencrypted, presumably so that LastPass can find and send just one encrypted password at a time instead of sending you the entire encrypted vault for every password.
Thanks for answering my question. I just got off the phone with Lastpass, complaining about this breach, asking to waive my premium subscription and further inquiring. For being a long-standing premium user, the best they could offer me was a 10% discount (LOL). They said that in the next month they will be coming out with an update regarding how many vaults were compromised, according to them it is still unknown how many vaults were copied. More importantly, they said that MFA will still be required to access the vault in case the master pass is brute-forced. What do you think about that? They said that anyone spreading info that MFA is not relevant in this breach is incorrect and that MFA is required in the case of this breach.
So when-ever you log off, store your vault under some cryptic but innocent name with someone like dropbox (and trust that hackers will not know what it is or whose encryption algorithm have been used) and then shred the vault on your PC? That is an accident waiting to happen.
Fix:There is now a LogIntegrity utility provided to generate signature files for logs.-- To enable the feature: tmsh modify sys db logintegrity.support value enable-- To set the LogIntegrity loglevel: tmsh modify sys db logintegrity.loglevel value debugYou must create private key and store it in SecureVault before enabling this feature. To do so:1. Generate a private key with the name logfile_integrity.key, for example: tmsh create sys crypto key logfile_integrity.key key-type rsa-private key-size 2048 gen-certificate security-type password country US city Seattle state WA organization "Example, Inc." ou "Example-Creation Team" common-name www.example.com email-address admin@example.com lifetime 3652. Generate RSA encrypted private SSL keys:2a. Go to the filestore location on the BIG-IP system: cd /config/filestore/files_d/Common_d/certificate_key_d/ ls grep logfile_integrity:Common:logfile_integrity.key_63031_2 openssl rsa -aes256 -in :Common:logfile_integrity.key_63031_2 -out logfile_integrity_secure.key2b. Specify the PEM password/passphrase (e.g., root0101) to use to protect the SSL private key (in this example, logfile_integrity_secure.key is the password protected private key):2c. run command to list the generated files ls grep logfile_integrity :Common:logfile_integrity.key_63031_2 logfile_integrity_secure.key3. Install the generated password protected SSL private key with the same password (e.g., root0101) used in step 2 to store in 'secure vault' on the BIG-IP system: tmsh install sys crypto key logfile_integrity.key passphrase example root0101 from-local-file logfile_integrity_secure.keyOnce the feature is enabled and the private key installed, The signature files are generated under /var/log/digest whenever log files get rotated.If you want to verify Signatures, follow these steps:1. Go to the filestore location on the BIG-IP system : cd /config/filestore/files_d/Common_d/certificate_d 2. Execute the following command to generate the public key. openssl x509 -in :Common:logfile_integrity.key_63031_2 -noout -pubkey > certificatefile.pub.cer3.Verify the signature file using public key: openssl dgst -sha256 -verify /config/filestore/files_d/Common_d/certificate_d/certificatefile.pub.cer -signature /var/log/digest/audit.1.sig /var/log/audit.1 2ff7e9595c
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